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Post‐Crisis Developments in Multinational Corporations’ Global Organisations 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) organisational responses to the 
global financial crisis. Relying on qualitative content analysis of the annual reports of MNCs in the 
automotive, electronics and machinery industries, and drawing on the results of interviews made with 
senior local executives, the association between the adverse turn in the business cycle and MNCs’ 
organisational reconfiguration actions is analysed, together with the key drivers of organisational 
restructuring. 
We find that the global crisis has reinforced and intensified ongoing organisational reconfiguration 
trends and argue that crisis-prompted responses need to be separated from fundamental organisational 
transformation catalysed by the crisis. Strategic organisational realignment programmes have been 
driven by long-standing technological and market trends rather than by transient developments. 
 
Keywords: crisis adaptation; organisational realignment, global financial crisis, 
environment‒strategy‒structure fit 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most papers addressing MNCs’ strategic reactions to the global financial crisis of 
2007‒2009 were concerned with actions that belong to the category of financial 
restructuring. Scholars analysed corporate spending plans to identify the prevalence 
of reductions in tangible and intangible investment (Banerjee et al., 2015; Borisova 
and Brown, 2013; Guevara and Bonfour, 2013; Rollins et al., 2014), and actions 
aimed at the restructuring of corporate debt (Damijan, 2014; De Fiore and Uhlig, 
2015). Another stream of research was concerned with firms’ labour-shedding 
behaviour and/or their adoption of alternative cost-cutting strategies (Du Caju et al., 
2015; Fabiani et al., 2015). A further prominent research question addressed the 
association between firm survival and the evolution of firms’ R&D budget during the 
crisis years (Archibugi et al., 2013).  
Although it is universally accepted that a changing environment induces 
responses not only in strategy but it also requires appropriate changes in firms’ 
organisations (cf. the classical thesis on the interrelation of environment, strategy, 
structure, and performance—Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1974) multinational 
corporations’ (MNCs) actions undertaken to reconfigure their global network 
organisations as a response to the crisis has received relatively little attention 
(important exceptions include Boyle and McDonnell, 2013; Ecorys, 2009; Knudsen 
and Foss, 2015; Lee and Makhija, 2009).  
This is all the more puzzling, given the recognition that effective orchestration 
of MNCs’ global network organisation is an important factor of competitiveness (De 
Marchi et al., 2014). Moreover, there are several different, albeit equally well-
established strands in the literature,1 such as the contingency theory (Child, 1972), 
the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2009), and the dynamic 
capabilities view (Augier and Teece, 2009; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) that are all 
concerned with the dynamic fit between organisational structure and the 
environment. Proponents of these theories maintain that firms actively build, 
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integrate, and reconfigure their (organisational) resources in response to changes in 
the environment.  
Hence, the objective of this paper is to investigate the association between the 
adverse developments in the business cycle in 2007‒2009 and MNCs’ organisational 
realignment actions. We analyse the features and the key drivers of MNCs’ 
organisational restructuring actions to find out whether economic downturn, indeed, 
prompted organisational reconfiguration actions, implemented to improve the fit of 
MNCs’ structure with the changed environment. 
We rely on two qualitative methods of analysis: (a) on a qualitative content 
analysis of a sample of MNCs’ annual reports in the automotive, electronics and 
machinery industries, and (b) on interviews made with senior local executives.  
The paper is organised in 5 sections. Section 2 provides a brief summary of 
the related literature. Section 3 presents the research method and the sample of the 
companies that we interviewed. Section 4 reviews the findings. Section 5 provides 
some concluding remarks and presents the limitations of our research.  
 
2. Conceptual framework—organisational restructuring in turbulent times 
 
Studies focusing on MNCs’ organisational responses to the radical contraction of 
market demand during the global crisis of 2007‒20092 originate partly in the strategy, 
structure, and performance paradigm (Chandler, 1962; Miles et al., 1978; Rumelt, 
1974) and partly in the corporate restructuring literature that focuses on changes in 
firms’ structure and processes (i.e. on organisational restructuring, along with 
financial restructuring and business portfolio restructuring—Bowman and Singh, 
1993). This research stream is also associated with the dynamic capabilities literature 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece et al. 1997) since it involves the reconfiguration 
of firms’ structures and the realignment of resources to meet the requirements of a 
changing external environment. 
As outlined previously, most of the empirical papers on responses to the crisis 
scrutinised cost-cutting actions. Accordingly, papers investigating crisis-triggered 
organisational transformation actions were concerned mainly with the occurrence, 
modes and outcomes of divestment (see review by Sanchez-Riofrío et al., 2015). The 
implicit assumption of these papers was that at times of crisis, firms would adopt 
retrenchment strategies and dispose of non-core business segments. A frequent 
research question of these papers was what makes a subsidiary or a business 
segment more-than-average exposed to divestment (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012; 
Decker and Mellewight, 2007; Fisch and Zschoche, 2012; Kolev, 2016; Lee, 2013; 
Song, 2014).  
A number of investigations focusing on firms’ acquisition behaviour during the 
global financial crisis have indirectly reinforced the dominance of retrenchment 
strategies. Despite some empirical evidence (Wan and Yiu, 2009) that acquisitions 
during economic downturn have a positive impact on performance, albeit this effect is 
moderated by the efficiency of post-acquisition organisational restructuring (Barkema 
and Schijven, 2008), most papers conclude that uncertainty avoidance and reactive 
strategies have been the norm during the crisis rather than the exception, and that 
the global crisis negatively affected the likelihood of both diversifying and cross-
border acquisitions (Cerrato et al., 2016; Kunc and Bhandari, 2011)—at least in the 
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case of MNCs headquartered in developed economies (see Anderson and 
Sutherland, 2015 for contrary evidence in emerging economies). 
Other crisis-driven organisational changes under scrutiny included corporate 
breakup transactions, such as equity carve-outs and spinoffs (Eckbo and Thorburn, 
2013), and the relocation of some operations offshore. These latter actions were 
often analysed together with reactions targeting the opposite direction: the insourcing 
or reshoring of previously outsourced/offshored operations (Boyle and McDonnell, 
2013; Drauz, 2014; Kinkel, 2012; Knudsen and Foss, 2015). With respect to MNCs’ 
decisions to outsource or, conversely, increase the vertical integration of activities in 
response to recessionary shocks, the evidence is mixed. Boyle and McDonnell 
(2013) posit that increased offshoring/outsourcing is characteristic mainly of MNCs 
originating from liberal-market economies. Knudsen and Foss (2015) found evidence 
for both increased and reduced vertical integration. Conversely, drawing on the 
analysis of a large sample of German manufacturing companies, Kinkel (2012) 
conjectures that, while relocation activities declined significantly since the emergence 
of the global economic crisis, the level of backshoring has remained stable. Kinkel 
also found that far-shore destinations in Asia have become preferred over near-shore 
locations in Eastern Europe.  
While the above-cited papers examined single (or a couple of) organisational 
initiatives, Fromhold-Eisebith (2015) set up an encompassing model of organisational 
responses to the crisis. She distinguished between (a) market reorientation, implying 
the restructuring of distribution channels and resources re-allocation: strengthening 
the manufacturing facilities that are in regions with promising end markets and, 
conversely, reducing investment in facilities operating in crisis-hit regions; (b) value 
chain optimisation, implying the reorganisation of supplier and outsourcing relations; 
(c) strategic reorganisation, including mergers and acquisitions, sale of corporate 
branches to others, and strategic alliances with partners and/or competitors; (d) 
innovation and upgrading-focussed strategy, implying the strengthening of R&D-
oriented and upgraded corporate branches and the shift of R&D and/or of other high 
value-adding tasks to these units; (e) relocation of production including site closures 
and the concentration of mandates in selected low-cost locations and/or the opening 
of new plants in low-cost locations; and, finally, (f) transformation of the entire 
production landscape, which includes steps as diverse as exiting selected markets, 
changing the operational focus, and establishing new enterprises. 
In line with Fromhold-Eisebith’s (2015) approach, we posit that MNCs’ post-
crisis organisational restructuring involved a complex set of—often interrelated—
actions, comprising a combination of business entries and exits, and reconfiguration 
of assets and resources. Furthermore, they were manifested also in other 
organisational dimensions, such as (de)centralisation, and cross-functional process 
redesign.  
In contrast with some critiques of the strategy‒structure‒performance 
construct, who question its applicability in high-velocity environments (reviewed by 
Amitabh and Gupta, 2010; and Aupperle et al., 2014) and cast doubt also on the 
direction of causality between the components of the construct (Galan‒Sanchez-
Bueno, 2009; Pertusa-Ortega et al., 2010), we argue that Chandler’s logic is 
applicable in a crisis / post-crisis environment. Note that we do not investigate the 
‘performance’ element in Chandler’s construct: our investigations are limited to the 
existence of a causal association between the crisis (which is the environment 
component of Chandler’s extended thesis — Child, 1972; Rumelt, 1974) and the 
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transformational changes that reorganised the structures of the surveyed MNCs, as 
they were perceived by the executives we interviewed. 
We argue that although changes in structure cannot be directly associated 
with changes in the business environment, the key drivers of organisational 
restructuring actions still suggest that Chandler’s environment → strategy → 
structure → performance construct3 applies also in a turbulent economic 
environment. 
To anticipate a finding of this study, we found that post-crisis changes in firms’ 
organisational structure have been driven by long-standing technological and market 
trends rather than by transient developments. The recognition of these trends 
influenced strategy, and triggered fundamental organisational transformation actions.  
 
3. Research method and sample 
 
To answer our research questions we applied two complementary qualitative 
methods. First we undertook qualitative content analysis (Bowen, 2009; Duriau et al., 
2007) of the annual reports of twelve global companies in the automotive, electronics 
and machinery industries. The period we surveyed spanned eight years, between 
2007 and 2014. In line with Duriau et al. (2007) we believe that content analysis is an 
appropriate method for investigating complex business phenomena including 
organisational transformations. Annual reports provide not only financial information, 
but they also list the key organisational developments of the given year, such as 
acquisitions, divestitures, establishment of new subsidiaries and functional centres, 
strategic alliances and so forth. They provide an organisation chart and describe the 
management and control structure. They include details about the company’s general 
strategic orientation and about new turns and new initiatives within functional 
strategies, including the organisational strategy. They also address questions of 
strategic risk and uncertainty.  
When surveying the annual reports, we checked for the occurrence of 
organisational actions, such as (a) divestitures and acquisitions; (b) production 
relocation, offshoring, outsourcing, versus backshoring or insourcing; (c) closure of 
facilities, versus establishment of new facilities (subsidiaries; research centres; 
shared services centres; and new regional headquarters); (d) consolidation of the 
organisational structure and value chain optimisation; (e) disposal (sale) of business 
segments, versus expansion in new business areas or geographical areas; (f) other 
fundamental organisational transformation actions. Furthermore, we reviewed the 
descriptions of new strategic orientations and analysed report sections on 
opportunities and risks. 
Content analysis was complemented with a multiple case study-based 
exploratory research (Eisenhardt 1989). By applying content analysis in conjunction 
with interviews we could triangulate the findings to maximise reliability. 
An interview guide containing predominantly open-ended questions allowed 
interviewees to provide rich descriptions of complex, multifaceted processes: to 
interpret and evaluate the organisational transformation actions during and following 
the crisis, and assess the main drivers of these actions. They were also asked to 
evaluate whether the organisational restructuring moves could be associated with the 
financial and demand shocks of the crisis years.  
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Interviewed managers were, in most cases (N = 10), CEOs of MNCs’ 
Hungarian subsidiaries, in two cases, Hungary-based divisional leaders were 
interviewed. The choice of respondents relative to the research question may seem 
problematic, since mother company executives could in principle provide more 
authentic information about the drivers of and the strategic considerations behind 
organisational transformation actions. However, our informants confirmed they had 
ample first-hand experience about the reasoning behind organisational 
transformation actions. They were involved in the decisions on relocation actions, 
since they participated in across-subsidiary competition for the various production 
activities and for hosting functional shared services centres: they elaborated 
arguments for being selected as a host country, and prepared feasibility studies. The 
reasoning behind location decisions were regarded as transparent. Regarding the 
fundamental organisational transformation actions, it was self-evident that HQ 
officers shared all the arguments that supported the new direction in the 
organisational strategy, in order to ensure local, divisional and functional executives’ 
commitment.  
When selecting the sample, we faced another problem that was also related to 
respondent bias. In line with global developments with respect to the average tenure 
and turnover of executives (average tenure shows a continuous decline and CEO 
turnover increases—Schloetzer et al., 2015), in Hungary it was also difficult to find 
large local subsidiaries with interviewed managers all in the same managerial 
position already during the crisis years. In our sample, only five managers out of 
twelve would fulfil this requirement. Neither were all interviewed managers in the 
same firm seven or eight years prior the interview: only ten out of twelve. 
Interestingly, the two newcomer CEOs worked previously (during the crisis years) at 
another firm in our sample. Nevertheless, all interviewed managers confirmed, they 
had sufficient information about both subsidiary-level and at the MNC-level firm-
specific developments during and after the crisis years. Moreover, we believe the 
quality of the respondents compensates for the occasional lack of their personal 
experience in the given position. 
We applied a purposeful sampling method (Patton, 1990) and selected 
foreign-owned global companies from the top 500 list of companies based in 
Hungary. Our aim was to select information-rich cases: companies whose insights 
draw on a multiplicity of experiences, i.e. companies whose cases promise 
observations about issues of central importance to our research. Instead of trying to 
reflect a maximum variation with our case selection, we opted for a more or less 
homogenous sample consisting of three industries (automotive, electronics and 
machinery) that accounted for more than 40 % of total Hungarian manufacturing 
production and nearly 60 % of manufacturing export in 2014.  
Actors in these industries have been hit particularly hard during the global 
crisis. As Ecorys (2009) argued, the exposure to adjustment pressures of each of 
these industries was above the average, because they are technology-intensive and 
highly globalised industries. Ecorys (2009) maintained that adjustment pressures are 
linked to innovation and technological changes—this finding is supported also by the 
results of our investigations (see section 4.2). Another commonality that accounts for 
the selection of these industries is that Central Europe is an important production 
location—at least from a European perspective (Pavlínek, 2015; Sass, 2015). 
We contacted twenty global companies and twelve of them accepted 
participation in our research. Altogether, our sample consists of twelve (American, 
Danish, German, and Swedish) MNCs operating in the automotive (2), automotive 
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electronics (2), electronics (4), and machinery (4) industries. On average, these 
companies had been operating in Hungary for more than 20 years at the time of the 
interview. The importance of the surveyed Hungarian subsidiaries, considered in 
terms of their contribution to their parent companies’ total production and/or total 
revenues, is heterogeneous: some are listed among the largest production facilities 
of their mother companies, contributing to 15 to 23 % of total turnover, while others 
account for a mere 0.5% of total sales. The average number of employees of the 
interviewed MNCs was 137,242 in 2014 (global employment). The average global 
turnover was EUR 31.36 billion in 2014. These numbers reflect that our sample 
consists of large global corporations. 
The interviews, 60 to 90 minutes in length, were conducted between 
September and November 2015. To preserve anonymity, neither corporate names 
nor main products will be specified. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of the surveyed companies 
 
No. Industry HQ 
location 
intervie
wee 
date No. Industry HQ 
location 
interviewe
e 
date 
1 E SE CEO 18/09/
15 
7 M DE CEO  
carved-out 
and sold 
division 
30/09/
15 
2 M DK CEO 22/09/
15 
8 E USA divisional 
leader 
07/10/
15 
3 A DE CEO 22/09/
15 
9 E USA CEO 13/10/
15 
4 E DE CEO 25/09/
15 
10 M DE CEO 14/10/
15 
5 A USA CEO 25/09/
15 
11 AE USA & 
DE 
CEO 15/10/
15 
6 M USA divisional 
leader 
29/09/
15 
12 AE DE CEO 09/11/
15 
 
A = automotive; E = electronics; AE = automotive electronics; M = machinery 
SE = Sweden, DK = Denmark, DE = Germany, CEO = chief executive officer, HQ = headquarters 
 
4. Findings  
 
4.1 Continuous and evolutionary organisational changes: few perceived direct effects of the 
crisis 
 
The first outcome of the analysis of the surveyed annual reports was that the MNC 
owners of the companies in the sample implemented a great number of 
organisational changes before, during, and after the crisis. These changes were not 
restricted to the divestment and sale of business units, and supply-chain optimisation: 
they also included targeted acquisitions, other expansionary moves, and actions 
aiming at the recombination of resources, such as the relocation of activities. 
In a number of cases, retrenchment-type changes occurred already before the 
crisis. Conversely, expansionary organisational actions, including establishment of 
new subsidiaries (both manufacturing facilities and sales companies) and new 
regional functional business units (such as service centres, distribution centres, test 
centres, and development centres), purchase of shares in existing joint ventures 
were also widespread. Furthermore, over time, the surveyed MNCs have increasingly 
8 
 
relied on strategic partnerships: in addition to acquisitions implemented to access 
specific technological expertise, they have forged strategic alliances with partners 
and/or competitors. 
Altogether, sample firms were characterised by quasi-continuous 
recombination of resources and reconfiguration of structure. The actions that shaped 
the surveyed firms’ organisational configuration during and after the global crisis were 
not consistent: actions would not unambiguously point in a specific direction, e.g. to 
retrenchment or, conversely, to expansion through proactive investments. As 
summarised in Table 2, each company in the sample implemented both reactive 
(defensive), and strategic (offensive) organisational transformation actions. Portfolio 
moves included both divestments and expansionary acquisitions, rationalisation and 
concentration of activities, and diversification and entry into new business areas. 
Another common development that took place several (four to seven) years 
after the crisis was the implementation of actions envisaging fundamental 
organisational transformation, such as changes in the business model; group-wide 
centralisation; reorganisation of the divisional structure; splitting the company into 
two. 
 
Table 2 
 
Examples of organisational changes implemented by owners of sample 
companies over the period between 2007 and 2014 
 
Defensive organisational transformation actions Companies 
Announcing and implementing cost and efficiency programmes; 
Divestments;  
Closing selected facilities; 
Discontinuation of selected business lines, streamlining product mix; 
Sale of shares in joint ventures; 
Simplifying the portfolio: disposing of and selling non-core businesses;  
Rationalising production and support processes; outsourcing, aligning 
capacity to changes in global demand; 
Relocating selected operations to low-cost countries;  
Merging selected group companies; 
Reducing costs through the revision of internal processes. 
1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 12 
1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
5, 6, 10, 12 
1, 4, 7, 8, 11,12 
1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 
4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 
1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
 
1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12 
2, 3, 4, 8, 
1, 2, 10, 11, 12 
Offensive (strategic) organisational transformation actions Companies 
• Acquisitions; 
• Reshoring (backshoring) previously offshored activities; 
• Establishment of new corporate R&D centres; or local development 
centres in promising markets that host production facilities;  
• Forging new strategic partnerships;  
• Concentrating selected support functions: establishing shared services 
centres; 
• Establishing new regional HQs in high-growth areas; 
• Establishing new plants / companies / sales offices to reinforce global 
presence; 
• Expanding production facilities in selected promising markets; 
• Development of new business areas: implying the creation of new 
business divisions and increased reliance on business segments that are 
less hard hit by the crisis; 
• Signing new joint venture agreements, or purchasing all shares in existing 
joint ventures 
1,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
10,11,12 
1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12 
 
1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 12 
1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11 
 
2, 6, 7, 8, 11 
2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12 
 
2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12 
 
3, 7, 12 
Fundamental organisational transformation actions Companies 
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• Shifting to a new, service-centric business model; 
• Implementation of Principal Company (PC) model with toll manufacturing 
(PC owns the stocks and is the only legal owner in terms of orders and 
goods; previously independent legal entity manufacturing subsidiaries 
become toll manufacturers); 
• Issuing initial public offering (NASDAQ); 
• Changing the business model from that of a broad conglomerate to that of 
a company more focussed on selected business lines; reducing the weight 
of the financial services division;  
• Establishing global functional units 
• Focusing on cross-segment collaboration 
• Establishing dedicated independent teams to enter new business areas or 
implement pilot projects;  
• Establishing internal start-ups related to new business areas 
• Splitting the global company into two independent global companies 
• Standardising processes; harmonising the corporate enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) system 
• Creating a new governance structure (decentralised operation 
management; centralised strategic management), redefining role processes 
and reporting lines 
• Establishing a localised structure, decentralising certain functions 
1, 2, 6, 8,  
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
6 
 
6 
6, 7, 11 
6, 7, 9 
 
7 
8 
10, 11 
 
11, 12 
 
 
8, 11, 12 
 
Source: interview information and corporate annual reports 
 
Incremental organisational changes have been driven by two contradictory forces, 
both of which can be observed at practically every company interviewed. The first 
factor that drives changes is the quest of mother companies to simplify the 
organisational structure, to enhance its coherence, and to improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation. The second factor is the perceived necessity of establishing an 
organisational imprint of new corporate initiatives and of newly-decided strategic 
directions. Driven by the ambition to increase stockholders’ value, maximise scale, 
improve efficiency, and increase returns, global companies come up with new 
business ideas and initiatives every year. Most of these initiatives have organisational 
implications as well. Together, these developments account for MNC organisations 
being in a constant state of flux. The accounts of two informants provide an 
illustration. 
 
‘We launched our excellence programme just before the crisis to harmonise the diverse management 
models of our business units into one common corporate excellence model. Since then, the programme 
has been refined and extended each year to include various group-wide ‘campaigns’ focusing among 
others on process improvement and process standardisation, the standardisation of product 
development, excellence in purchasing and supply chain management, quality improvement, and 
energy efficiency. Most of these campaigns within the excellence programme have had organisational 
implications: some smaller or larger changes in the organisational structure have been implemented. 
Examples include the creation of an Excellence Steering Group, a Process Management Board, the 
establishment of new centres of excellence, and the creation of group-wide energy management jobs’. 
‘When reviewing our business perspectives and preparing a medium-term roadmap during the crisis 
years, we have acknowledged that our core business does not offer satisfactory growth prospects. We 
launched an ambitious initiative aiming to discover new business areas and new technology platforms 
and launch new products. We created an organisational structure that facilitates experimentation with 
new businesses and new innovation platforms – keeping in mind that these experimentations may end 
up either with the sale of the given new segment or with its integration in the corporate architecture. As it 
often happens, the related organisational transformation did not immediately produce the expected 
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results. Consequently, we modified it again and experimented with new structures and new governance 
forms for years before arriving at the present setup’.  
 
The managers interviewed unanimously claimed that few of the fundamental 
organisational changes could be traced back directly to recessionary shocks. They 
emphasised that differentiation is necessary between MNC-level strategic 
realignment and immediate reactions to economic downturns. Indeed, some 
immediate reactions envisaged cost reduction and were manifested in relocation 
moves and/or the closure of facilities in high-cost locations. Conspicuous as they 
seem in the light of media coverage, these are dwarfed by strategic organisational 
reconfiguration actions. However, few of these latter moves were directly associated 
with the rapidly aggravating international business environment.  
One explanation of the few perceived direct effects of the crisis is that 
fundamental organisational realignment actions were regarded as being the outcome 
of organic development. Rather than being directly associated with the downturn of 
the business cycle, organisational changes have been explained by owners’ long-
term strategies.4  
The following account illustrates the claim that major organisational 
transformations result from long-considered strategic decisions rather than being 
driven by transient developments. 
 
‘When our owner decided to divest and sell its pneumatics business line, the executives considered two 
alternative options. Although pneumatics had clear advantages: good performance indicators, the 
globally known brand name of our owner, and strong relations with other divisions, the size and the 
market share of this division did not match those of the top global competitors. In pneumatics, we were 
the third largest in Europe. However, in an era of global consolidation and with escalating price 
pressures, only the largest can survive. One option would have been to take over one of the key 
competitors (they are, however, larger by an order of magnitude than this business segment of our 
owner). Another possibility: to merge this business line with another one within the MNC’s organisation 
and try to achieve, thereby, additional economies of scale. Our owner chose the third option: it 
restructured the pneumatics segment through relocations and capacity optimisation, divested, and sold 
it’.  
 
As for the few organisational actions that were associated with the crisis, only the 
catalysing effect of environmental turbulences has been acknowledged, as illustrated 
by the following quotes. 
 
‘Crisis has brought out existing organisational and production inefficiencies. You know, when we are 
riding the expansion wave, we pay less attention to the hidden assets—to the huge savings we can 
achieve with some creative reorganisation steps’.  
‘Crisis prompted cost reduction and restructuring actions. Turnaround followed quite rapidly, due partly 
to beneficial market trends. The company started to grow at an extraordinary speed. Some years later, 
in 2014, the global HQ launched a comprehensive, multi-year organisational restructuring programme to 
optimise the functional and the operations procedures and to harmonise and standardise the IT 
systems. This restructuring was not prompted by the crisis but rather by the subsequent rapid growth 
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through acquisitions that necessitated the corporate-wide harmonisation of cultures, IT systems, and 
processes’. 
  
4.2 Key drivers of major organisational changes: long-standing market and technological trends 
 
An important finding that crystallised from the interviews is that long-standing 
technological and market trends were the main drivers of actions involving 
fundamental organisational transformation.  
The surveyed MNCs systematically monitor and analyse industry-specific 
technological and market trends to detect opportunities and threats as early as 
possible.  
According to our informants, key trends that influenced the organisational 
strategy and the structure were (a) the shifting composition of global demand; (b) the 
consolidation and concentration of global value chains and the resulting increase in 
the market power of the survived actors; and (c) industry-specific technological 
trends. This section reviews them in turn, together with the surveyed firms’ 
organisational responses.  
The phenomenon of shifting end-markets from North to South is a thoroughly 
discussed development (e.g. Cattaneo et al., 2010; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011). 
The global crisis accentuated the ‘new market imperative’ (Coe and Yeung, 2015, p. 
101). Indeed, the new market imperative was mentioned by almost all our informants, 
as a trigger for strategy transformation that, in turn, had organisational implications. 
Organisational responses to the new market imperative were manifested in the 
establishment of new plants, sales offices, distribution and logistics centres and 
development centres in high-growth regions. One of the most conspicuous 
organisational moves that reflected a shifting focus towards new growth regions was 
the establishment of new regional HQs in selected emerging markets. Overall, 
responses reflected a general effort to increase global presence.  
Another recognition that provoked organisational responses was that the 
competitive landscape has changed considerably. New competitors emerged and, 
conversely, the number of existing competitors diminished due to mergers and 
acquisitions. The survived established competitors have, however, leveraged their 
increasingly global scale. Furthermore, the buyers/customers of the companies in the 
sample engaged in acquisitions and takeovers themselves. Buyers (e.g. large original 
equipment manufacturers) consolidated and concentrated their procurement to attain 
better prices. Similarly, suppliers also became more powerful due to industry 
concentration and consolidation. Technology development (discussed later) 
necessitated the integration of new, specialised suppliers in the value chain that, in 
turn, leveraged their specialised expertise and captured an increasing share of total 
profit. 
Together, these factors exerted pressure on the prices and margins of the 
surveyed MNCs.  
The changing competitive landscape prompted the surveyed global companies 
to increasingly tailor their solutions to customers’ specific needs and localise their 
businesses. Moreover, to compensate for falling margins, firms transformed their 
business models from product-based to service-centric, another long-standing trend 
that was accentuated by the crisis. By 2008, both types of organisational realignment 
had been pursued for at least five years. However, the global crisis significantly 
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intensified these processes.5 The accounts of several managers interviewed 
demonstrate the strong association between changes in strategy (increased 
customer focus, localisation, and service-driven business model transformation) and 
changes in structure. 
 
‘Recognising that some of our customers account for a larger share of our total revenues than some 
countries in total (!), a network of key account managers has been created. We realised that we can 
hardly compete on the basis of ‘global products’ and ‘global operations’ any more. We created a 
corporate division responsible for implementing the twin tasks of global products and local business. We 
increasingly localise support activities as well’.  
‘In contrast to the previous organisational setup with division-specific global and regional sales teams 
working together, nowadays customer-specific key account managers coordinate the preparation of 
individual large projects. Two key account managers work together: the one responsible for the 
customer in the country where the customer’s HQ are located and the one responsible for the 
customer’s subsidiary in the country where the project is going to be implemented. This ensures that our 
proposal is really tailored to the specifics of the planned project’.  
 
Industry-specific technological trends (such as electromobility and automated driving) 
and advances in other broad technology areas (Manyika et al., 2013) represent the 
third, albeit the most important factor that influenced the reconfiguration of sample 
companies’ organisations. Table 3 presents some examples and summarises sample 
companies’ organisational responses to them. Across-sample organisational 
responses to the recognised trends were heterogeneous in terms of companies’ 
make-or-buy choices. Some companies built up in-house capabilities, while others 
relied on newly formed strategic partnerships or resorted to external services 
providers, although hybrid solutions were the most common. 
 
Table 3  
 
Sample companies’ organisational responses to technological trends 
 
Examples of 
technological trends 
Organisational responses* 
New paradigms in 
manufacturing, such as 
ubiquitous computing; cloud-
based manufacturing services; 
big data 
 Establishment of dedicated corporate divisions that reflect the 
newly defined scope of the business;  
 Creation of a new executive position: that of a chief digital officer; 
 Strategic alliances, new partnerships;  
 New work organisation: digital workplaces, virtual teams, new job 
descriptions; 
 Investments in in-house capabilities to collect, integrate and 
analyse data; 
 Implementation of the necessary related organisational changes;  
 Increased reliance on new digital support solutions (part of them 
outsourced). 
New paradigms in 
manufacturing, such as 
robotics, integrated automation 
solutions; 3D printing; new 
materials 
 Investment by corporate venture capital funds into promising 
new ventures;  
 Targeted takeovers to extend the value chain coverage; 
 In-sourcing (3D printing in-house of parts that were previously 
                                            
5
 Note that the two processes are closely interrelated: service-centric business models emphasise 
local responsiveness, while product-centric models are, rather, associated with global integration 
(Prahalad and Doz, 1988). 
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purchased from external vendors); 
 Backshoring of selected activities; 
 Establishment of new centres of excellence and business 
divisions 
 Increased reliance on open innovation;  
 Strategic partnerships, e.g. with software solutions providers 
whose software will be embedded in production process. 
Greater connectivity, Internet 
of Things (IoT), smart 
factories; 
convergence of information 
technology and manufacturing 
technology to culminate in the 
emergence of cyber-physical 
production systems 
(Monostori, 2015) 
 Expansion in new business areas opened up by digital 
developments:  
 Establishment of new corporate divisions and centres of 
excellence;  
 Intensified acquisition activity;  
 Improved supply chain visibility (enhanced supply chain 
integration) contributes to streamlining and optimising the supply 
chain; 
 New strategic partnerships, open innovation; 
 Increased cross-divisional collaboration (involving new job 
descriptions and new executive positions) to bring together ‘the 
physical’ and ‘the digital’. 
Intelligent (smart, connected) 
products (Porter and 
Heppelmann, 2014, 2015) 
 Strategic partnerships with IT-service providers to jointly develop 
product-embedded intelligence solutions;  
 Building up additional in-house research capacities;  
 Increased reliance on open innovation; 
 Targeted acquisitions to gain access to complementary 
technology. 
The ‘Sustainability imperative’ 
(lowering energy consumption 
and CO2 emissions in the 
production process) 
 Establishment of dedicated green functional departments;  
 Merger and transfer of related activities performed previously in 
isolated functional departments;  
 Creation of new executive jobs; cross-divisional collaboration for 
green objectives;  
 Reorganisation of the supply chain;  
 Expansion and diversification of the R&D team;  
 Establishment of new centres of excellence;  
 New technological partnerships, e.g. through participation in 
research consortia working on green solutions. 
Modularisation of product 
architecture 
 Reorganisation of the supply chain: development of stronger ties 
with selected suppliers;  
 Increased reliance on relocation to low-cost premises;  
 Acquisitions to increase the integration of the solution (the 
module);  
 Increased reliance on open innovation; 
 Increase of the global footprint.  
* Individual companies resorted to one or several of the listed actions. 
Source: interview information and corporate annual reports 
 
In summary, newly identified emerging technological and market trends have exerted 
a greater and more obvious influence on organisational changes at the surveyed 
companies than have transient developments in the business cycle. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the real-world phenomena of MNCs’ 
organisational reconfiguration actions during and after the global crisis of 2007 – 
2009. We argued that the global crisis reinforced and intensified MNCs’ ongoing 
organisational reconfiguration trends. Global value chain-orchestrating multinational 
companies are characterised by active portfolio management strategy; they flexibly 
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adapt to adverse (or to beneficial) changes in the business environment through 
divestments, reorganisation, expansion, and acquisitions, or by switching value-
adding activities between affiliates. They have constantly shifting portfolios of assets; 
in this sense, real sector companies resemble financial investors. They implement 
continuous, experimental changes in the organisational design to improve the 
efficiency of coordination, enhance integration and coherence, facilitate exploration, 
and bolster exploitation. 
Although the global crisis prompted a number of cost-cutting actions, including 
the occasional closure or sale of facilities, reorganisation, and relocation — actions 
involving fundamental organisational transformation (i.e. actions that transcended 
mere cost cutting) cannot be directly associated with the crisis. The strategic 
organisational realignment programmes that have been implemented with shorter or 
longer time lags after the crisis, have been driven by long-standing technological and 
market trends. The recognition of these trends, i.e. of changes in the business 
environment induced new strategic directions and, in turn, prompted the 
implementation of fundamental changes in the surveyed MNCs’ organisational 
structure. 
This research has a number of limitations. A primary limitation is sample 
selection bias; large, global MNCs may weather the crisis more easily than family-
owned internationalised ventures with a couple of low-cost production facilities. 
Crisis-driven adjustment and reorganisation steps, as well as reliance on counter-
cyclical strategies, may significantly differ across various size categories.  
Another limitation is that the interviews concentrated on the experience of 
executives operating in one peripheral country, making the generalisation of the 
findings quite problematic (even if the interviewed managers claim they have an 
overview of the processes of the whole multinational enterprise). Their position is 
obviously biased by operating in an affiliate of smaller importance. Although this 
limitation was tried to be controlled for by the systematic analysis of MNC-level 
documents, caution is required, especially, when interpreting the managers’ quotes. 
The strong industry-specific character of the drivers of organisational 
reconfiguration represents a further limitation. Further research is required to explore 
the factors that influenced the reaction of MNCs to the global crisis in other 
industries.  
Finally, this research has not controlled for home and host country-specific 
institutional factors that also might have shaped the surveyed MNCs’ behaviour.  
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